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Until  comparatively  recently, even  economists  general  ly  favorable
to unregulated  markets  have  tended  to accept  the  exjsting  regulatory  and
safety-net  systems  for depository  institutions.  They  djd so on the theory
that,  in some relevant  sense, banking js  "specia1.,'  And even those
i  1  1-di  sposed toward banki  ng  regul  ati  on  endorsed federal  i  nsurance of
depos'its. For jnstance, jn their  monetary  history of  the  United  States,
Friedman  and  Schwariz  (1963,  p.434)  concluded  that:  "Federal  insurance  of
bank  deposits  was  the most  important  structural  change in  the  banking
system to  result  from  the  1933 panic,  and,  indeed in our view, the
structural change  most  conducive  to monetary stability  sjnce  state  bank
notes  were  taxed  out  of  existence  immediateiy  after the Civjl  War."1
Deposit  insurance  was,  as it  were,  the government  jntervention that worked.
Endorsement  of  the  existing  deposit-insurance system invites,
however,  14hat I  cal  I  the  sophi  sti cated  argument  supporti  ng  banki  ng
regulation.  The  argument  begins  with the standard moral  hazard argument
against  charging a flat-rate  premium  for deposit jnsurance:  it  encourages
bank  managers  to jncur more  risk  in order to secure greater  returns.  As
Kareken  (1983,  p. 198)  phrases  it,  rrunless  insured  banks  are to be as risky
as profit  maximization  dictates,  they  must,  one  way or  another,  be
effectively  regulated;  they  must,  that  is,  be limited by regulation to
appropriately  ri sky balance  sheets."2
The  sophistjcated argument  for  regulating  banks  is  wjdely
accepted:  the incenljves  established  by the deposit insurance  system  needz
to be offset by r"egulation.3 Though  the argument is  widely  accepted, I
believe  it  is flawed  both  conceptually  and  historically.  In what  follows,
I  first  examjne  why  the argument  seems  so plausible.  Next, I  argue thar,
regardless of  deposit-insurance reform,  further  deregulation would  be
stabiiizing not destabilizing.  Then  I  consider  the case  of the savings  and
loan  industry,  which  seerns  to be an instance  of deregulation  gone  bad.  I
conclude  by examining  some  recent public policy proposai  s.
Banking: Structure andStabi  I i  ty
The  Gl  ass-Steaga11  Act
The  same  act  that  established federal  deposit  insurance also
enacted a  system of  binding  regulations  on commercial  banks.  If  they
vtanted  to avajl themselves  of deposit insurance,  banks  would  be required  to
adhere  to the new  rules.  For  member  banks  in the Federal  Reserve  System  (a
set comprising  all  national banks)  there was  no choice:  all  were  required
to  ioin  the FDIC. Certain'ly  a superficial analysis of the Banking  Act of
1933  supports  the sophi  sticated argument  for regulation.  Moreover,  on  its
own terms,  the system  worked  well for three or four decades. Annual  bank
fai lures decl  ined from  triple-digit  to double-digit to single-digit  figunes
(Friedman and  Sch!t'artz  [1963], p.  437.  )  During  this  period, Friedman  and
Schwartz'  s encomium  seems  merited.
It  appears,  then, that,  during the per"iod  of  low  bank failures,
regulation  offset  the  incentives  for  risk  taking  generated bys
single-premium  deposit insurance. The  Banking  Act of 1933  can  be viewed  in
an  a.lternative  Iight,  however.  The  alternative  appnoach  Views the
legislation as having  enacted  a cartel-like  arrangement  jn  the  financial
servjces  industry.  The  Banking  Act artifjciaily  created  three jndustrjes
out of  one  emerging  financial  services  industny:  commercial  banking,
investment banking and  savjngs  (i.e.,  nonbank  depos'itory  institutions).4
For quite a time, competition  among  the  the  three  sets  of  players  was
largely intramural; for instance, commercial  banks  and  investment  banks  did
not play on a common  field.
Each  set  of  jnstjtutions  gained something  important in  this
market-segmenting  scheme.  Investment banks  and  brokers  were  big gainers
because  the major  commercial  bankers had  become  formidable competitors
through  the use  of securities affiliates.  Eugene  Nel  son  White  (1986,  p.35)
reports that national banksr  securities business  grew  rapidly in the 1920s,
so  that  in  the peak  year of 1931  there were  114  national bank  affiljates
and  723  conducting securities  business in  their  bond  departments.
Additionally,  many more traded securities and  provided  investment  advice
rron  an occasional  basis.r' According to  l{hite  (1986,  p.36),  commercial
banks widened the  market for  securities by heavi  1y  discounting  standard
brokerage  fees.  Commercial  banks'  fees  were  about  one-fourth  those  of  the
New  York  brokerage  commissjon,  making  them  lthe contemporary  equivalents  of
rdiscount  brokers.  "r  In this  competitive  environment,  the potential  rents
for  investment  bankers  from  excluding  commercial  banks  are obvjous.
The  modal  bank  al so  stood  to  gai  n  i n  the  aftermath of  the
bloodbath  in commercial  banking. Deposit  insurance  offered the promise of4
stabilizjng  the  deposit  base.  l4oreover, the modal  bank  was  not deeply
involved  in the securities busjness.  Most  small  bankers were  probably
happy to see  the national banks  lose their  securitjes busjness. One  would
surmise  that larger natjona'l  banks  would  have  viewed the  Act  with  mixed
feelings  at  best."  They  had  the most  to lose and  they needed  the deposit
guaranty  less than did the average  bank.  Stil1,  the  national  banks were
outnumbered.
In  the  unstable environment  of the 1930s,  a cartel-like  scheme
arguably  stabilized demand  for most  firms  in  each  sub-market,  The Acr
abated competitive pressures and,  most  importantly,  stanched deposit
outflows.  That the new  law  appeared  attractive at the tjme does  not  seem
surprising.  In retrospect, it  remains  somewhat  of a conundrum  why  jt  took
so long to unravel.  The  stable, low jnterest-rate envjronment  of  the  war
and  early  postwar years  surely  played  a  ro1e, as did the concomitant
conservative  behavior  of commercial  banks.  0n this  issue.  however. more
work  cleariy needs  to be  done.
To  recapjtulate,  in  this  subsection I  have  suggested  that the
Banking  Act provided  immediate  stability  through  its  guaranty of  deposjts
and  long-term  stabil ity  through  its  abatement  of competitive  forces jn the
financial services  industry.  This explanation  depends  in  no  way on  the
contention  that  those  activitjes  prohibited  to banks  are categorical'ly
riskier  than the provision  of  commencial  loans.  indeed, I  rebut  that
argument  directly  be1ow.  Before moving on, however,  I  analyze  in more
depth  who  gained  among  commercial  banks.  Answering  this  question al  so
further illuminates the risk  issue.The Road  Not Ta  ken
Even in  the  midst of the 1933  banking  crisjs,  some  policymakers
were  acutely aware  that market  solutions existed.  In the debate over  tne
creation of the FDIC,  the Comptroller  of the Currency,  John  Po1e,  commented
on the Banking  Act of 1.933:  "I  am  in agreement  with the  ultimate  purpose
of this  bi11, namely,  greater safety to the depositor.  The  method  proposed
by the bill  and  the principles whjch  i  advocate  stand  at opposite  poles.  A
general  gual  anty  of  deposits  is the very antithesis of branch  banking."6
In other words,  a competitive  system  of branched  and  diversified banks was
proffered as a substitute for the restricted branching  system  found  in most
states at that time.
There was an  historjcal  model to  support the  Comptro]  lerrs
posjtion.  In  the  aftermath of  the  1907 panic,  the Caljfornja State
legislature reacted  by passing  the most  liberal  branching  law ever  enacted
in  the  United  States  (White  [1983], p.196).  The  law led to a substantial
increase  in branching  within the state, sparked  by the rapid growth of  A.
P. Giannini's Bank  of italy  (trJhite  [1983], p.160).
Most  states  did  not  follow California but many  instead  fl irted
with state deposit-guaranty  systems. The  two  models  --  branching freedom
and  deposit  guaranty --  v./ere  alternatjve responses  to achieving  banking
stabil  ity.  White  (1983,  p.196)  found that  "branch banking and  deposit
insurance were  incompatibie.  No  state  that  permitted  branch  banking
seriously entertained  the idea of deposit jnsurance.r'b
As successful  as branch  banking  was, state guaranty  funds  --  then,
as  now  --  were  abject failures.  The  decline 'in agricultural prjces in the
1920s  led to bank  failures  in the West  and  the South.  In 1923 a  wave of
bank  failures  in these  regions  crippled the voluntary systems  (l{hite [1983]
p.217).  By  the end  of the decade,  even  the compulsory  systems  were  falling
by  the  wayside.  llihjte  (1983,  p.218)  concluded  that rrthe  agnicultural
depression  wrecked  the rest of the systems  as liabilitjes  of the  guarantee
funds  greatly exceeded  their assets."
0n the eve  of Glass-Steagal'l  ,  banking  reformers  were  thus divided
into two hostile camps,  one  bent on preserving,  the  other  on  eliminating
unit  bankingrr  (ldhite  [1983], p. 197).  The  Comptroller  backed  branching.
Representative  Henry  Steagall suffered no jllusions  about  the  purpose of
the  bi  I  I  argui  ng that:  I'Thi  s bi  I  I wi  1l preserve  i  ndependent  dual banki  ng
in the United  States...that is what  the bill  in intended  to d0".7  Then.  as
now,  rr'independent  dual  banking"  is a code-phrase  for rrunit  banking.'r It
rhetorical  ly  wraps a  policy  restricting  competition in  the  garb  of
competition  and  decentral  ization.
The  importance  of understanding  the origjns of the Banking  Act of
1933  js not  merely historical  but  also  analytical.  An  understanding
reveals  first  what  is being  protected: the unit-banking  system. Moreover,
it  clarifies  the reasons  why  the era in whjch  the Banking  Act was  effective
was  one  of  I  ow  bank fai I  ure.  So  i  ong  as  the Act successful  ly  he  ld
competitive  financial forces in check,  then so long could  deposit jnsurance
protect  unit  banks.  lt  was  not, then, that bank  fajlures were  reduced
through  having  increased  bank  safety.  Rather,  by  reducing competjtionI
among  financial  institutions,  the  Banking Act  held  in  check the
nestructuring  of the fjnancial servjces  industry that has  only  now begun
once  aga  i  n.
Unit  bankers  needed  protection, of course,  not only from  nonbanks
but from larger commercial  banks.  Had  national banks  been  able to contjnue
to  exploit the complementarities  of commercial  and  investment  banking,  the
financial  services  industry  would  surely  have  been  transformed.S
Diversified  nationai  banks would have grov/n at  the  expense  of both
investment  banks  and  undiversified unit banks.
The  restrictions on commercial  banksr  oowers  do not so much  offset
incentives  for risk taking provided  by deposit insurance  as they reinforce
the  protection  afforded  to  unit  banks by  deposit  insurance.  This
interpretation turns the sophisticated  argument  for regulation on 'its head.
If  the interpretation js  correct, then the existence  of  deposit  insurance
is  not  a  reason to  forgo  deregulation of  the  asset  side of banksl
balance  sheets.  Indeed,  given  that  competitive forces  have upset  the
delicately  crafted  balance of the reguiatory  and  safety-net systems,  the
case  for deregulation  is  stronger  than  ever.  In  the  next  section,  I
develop the  case  in  more depth  by  focusing on the benefits of asset
di  vers  i  fi cati  on  .
Deregul  at  i  on  : Assets  or Liabil  it'ies?
The  saga  of the dereguiation of  banks'
wel  I  -known: inflationary  forces,  technological
liabilities  is  by  now
advances  and  fi nanci  alU
innovation  combined  to render  obsolete  the system  of interest-rate controls
on the liabjlities  of depository  institutions.9  Liability  deregulation  was
lar"gely  market-driven  wjth regulatory changes  reflecting  lagged poljtical
responses  to  economic  real  ities.  f'lore  recently, barriers to interstate
banking having been fa11ing.  Thjs  reflects  a  kind  of  geographical
deregulatjon,  one  largely wrought  at the state legislative 1eve1.
The  system  of regulations  on bank  powers,  or,  broadly speaking,  on
the  composition of  their  portfolios,  has  proved more durable  than
regulations  on  either  banksr  I  iabilities  or  their  branching powers.
Fundamental  change  here  must  come  in Congress.  Accordingly,  the  prognosis
for  asset  deregulation js  not  good.  As  the  recent  banking bill
i1lustrates,  competing  interests jn the  financia'l  services  industry  can
block  meaningful reform.  Indeed,  what  begins  as a deregulation  bill  can
end  as a bjll  to reregulate  (En91and  [1987], p. 7).
Correctly identifying what  kjnd of deregulation  has  taken  place is
crucial  for  assessing the  I  i  kely  effects of further"  deregulation.  The
popuiar  press is full  of accounts  that assocjate  the new  pov/ers  that  banks
have  been  gjven  with recent  problems  in the industry.  But commercial  banks
have been gi  ven  no  new asset  powers.  Banks expenienci  ng  earn  ings
difficulties  and  capital shortfall  s have  arrjved at this  situation the old
fashioned  way  --  by making  bad  1oans. To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  no
commerci  al  bank  has  fai I  ed  j n  recent  years  other  than by maki  ng bad
I  orn,  .  10
Far from  being  part of the current problem,  asset  deregulation  js
surely  part of the future solutjon.  Any  asset  would  improve  a bank's risk9
standing,  so  long  as  the  newly acquired asset  represented portfolio
diversification.  Assume,  hypothetically,  that both the rjsk and  r"eturns
from  owning  and  operating  a gaming  casino  were  higher on average than  for
other  bank assets, but the higher risk vrere  uncorrelated  wjth that of the
other assets in the typical bank  portfol  io.  In thi s case, informed publ  ic
pol  jcy  ought to  permit  banks to  enter  thi s  I  ine  of activity.  This
conclusion  is  so far removed  from  conventional  wisdom  that I will  defend  it
bri  ef1y.
Virtually  the  entire regulatory  and  supervisory  system  for banks
is predicated  on a categorical  vjew  of risk.  Some  activitjes,  like  equity
investment in  real  estate  or  underwriting corporate  securities,  are
inherently risky and  must  be denied  banks. Other  activities,  like  making
commercial  1oans, are  less risKy and  banks  may  be permitted  to engage  in
these  activjties  Irpnudently.rr  Final  ly,  some activities,  like  purchas.ing
government bonds, are  characterjzed by  I  jttle  risk  and  are  to  be
encouraged,
The  categorical  view  of risk  is  inconsistent  with  modern  finance
and  economjc  theory,  which  focuses on portfol  io risk.  As in my  casino
example,  an individual asset  may  experience  a high vaniance  in returns  but
the  variance be  uncorrelated with  that  of the remaining  assets  in the
portfolio.  If  the asset also yie'lds  an above-average  return, this makes  jt
a  candidate  for inclusion in a bank's  portfo'l  io.  |rlhi'le  regulators  look at
the aver:age  ri sk  of  assets,  portfol  i  o  managers  correctly  assess the
marginal risk  of  adding an  asset  to  their  portfolios.  Addltjons  to
portfolios of apparently  risky assets  can,  in  principle,  reduce overall
ri sk.10
Granted that  depos.it  jnsurance  leads  banks  to jncur greater risk
than they would  otherwise,  it  would  still  be  beneficjal  to  permjt  these
depository  institutions  maximal  freedom  to diversify  their  investm"ntr.ll
The  argument  gains  more  empirical force  when one  examjnes  some of  the
obvious candidates for  expanded  bank po\{ers.  I  consider  two: selling
i  n  surance  and  underwriting  securities.
Permitting  banks  to sell  insurance  would  generate  fee income with
little  addjtional  equity  commitment  from  banks.  In  many  cases,  the
activity  could  be conducted  on  existing  bank premises.  Earnings fnom
selling  (as opposed  to underwriting)  insurance  are relatively  stable (that
is,  they have  a low  beta  relative  to  that  of  other  assets  in  banks'
portfolios).  Texas  savings  and  1oans,  who  are permitted  to engage  in this
activity,  are using such  fees as a safe 'income  source  jn  an  era  of  loan
losses  and  retrenchment  in their  traditional  lines of business. Commercial
banks  would  be  well-served  if  they had  such  an option.  The  economjc  case
for  permitting  banks to  engage in  this  line  of  activjty  is fairly
stra  i  ghtforward.
Underwniting  securjties is only a  slightly  more complex issue.
Banks must  commit  equity capital to the activity.  To  the degree  that they
borrow  capital,  they are leveraged  and  incur additional rjsk.  Once again,
however, it  is  not  the  rjskiness  of  underwriting  securities but what
engaging  in this activjty  does  to the overa.l  1 probabi  I  ity  of losses  for  a
bank.  Using a logit  model  , White  (1986,  p. 41) found  that,  historically,
"the  presence of  a  Isecurity]  affi I  iate  seems to  have  reduced the
probability  of  bank  failure.'r  Whereas  26.3 percent  of all  national banks11
failed between  1930-33,  only 6.5 percent  of the 62 banks  with affiIiates  jn
1929 and  7.6  percent  of  the 145  banks  with large securities operations
conducted  through  thejr  bond  departments  failed during this  per"iod (llhite
[1986],  p.  40).  As the probabiljty-of-failure  results suggest,  entering
investment  banking in  the  1920s represented safe  djversification  for
commercjai  banks.  |dhite  (1986,  pp. 44-45)  found  that adding  a securities
affi I  iate rai  sed  a commercial  bankrs rate  of  return  substantial  ly  but
increased  the standard  deviation of incone  only slight1y.
There are many  issues  involved  jn establishing  publ  ic policy with
respect  to banksr  asset povrers  generaliy  and with  respect  to  the  two
specific  activities  cjted  here.  I  have not  attempted an exhaustjve
analysis of all  factors,  economic  and  political .12  Rather,  my maJor
purpose in  th'i  s  section  was  twofold.  First,  I  countered  the perception
that commercial  banks  have  gained  significant new asset  powers and  that
these  have contnibuted  to current banking  problems. Second,  I  focused  on
the conceptual  error in the existing  regulatory  system, which  tries  to
categorize  risk  instead  of to assess  overal  I  portfolio  risk.
What I  am suggesting  is a reorientation of public policy toward
bank  powers. If,  ceterj  s paribus,  diversification  is  stabilizing,  then
pol  icy  ought to  be encouraging  it  rather than denying  banks  the means  of
diversifying.  Instead  of worrying  so  much  about  what  banks  put into  their
portfol  ios,  regulators  shouid be  more  concerned  with what  banks  are not
putting in their  portfol  ios (e.9.,  those  assets  tending  to diversify risk).
The  argument  suggests  a tentative, practjcal conciusion.  If  any
part  of  the regulatory system  has  the capability,  in principle,  to assess1?
portfolio  risk,  it  is the supervisory  function.  Properly  trained, audjtors
could  apply  technjques to  measure  diver"sjfication  and  portfol  io risk
rel  ative to some  standard.  From  an  economic  perspecti  ve,  thi s  approach
certai  nly  seems  preferabl  e  to  assessi  ng  ri sk  by  category,  Yet,  as
discussed  in the final  section, public policy js moving  toward formal'iz'i  ng
the categorizing  of ri sk.
The  next section examines  the current basket  case  among  depository
institutions  --  the I'brain  deadrr  savings  and  loans.  This  'i  s  an  area  in
whjch  expanded  asset  powers seem  to  have  led  to  greater  financjal
difficulties.  As i s  so  often  the  case,  however, appearances  can  be
decept  i  ve  .
The  Thri  ft  Cri  si  s
The  savings and  loan industry is often pictured as an example  of
the perils  of expanding  asset  powers for  deposjtory  'institutions.  The
suggestion is  made that we  cannot  allow the banking  industny  to get into
the predicament  in which  S&Ls  now find  themselves.  And,  certainly,  an
examination of  industry  balance  sheets  makes  jt  appear  that S&Ls,  if  not
already  given  the powers  to operate  casinos,  have certainly  been at  the
gaming tables  and  lost heavj  ly.  Conditjons  have  deteniorated  even  since
the recent analysis by Kane  (1987).  Yet the conventional  wisdom  begs all
the imDortant  ouestions.
First,  expanded  thrift  powers  cannot  explain the thrift  crisis  as
presently constituted.  As Kane  (1987)  emphasizes,  the  critical  problems13
all  derive from  the exjstence  of the Iiving-dead  S&Ls  --  rrzombies,"  in his
colorful  terminology.  BeLtjng the  S&L on  a  high-risk  strategy  can
certainly  lead  to  faj lure.  The  unique  problem  in the thrift  industry'
however, stens  from  the  continued  activities  of  already  failed
jnstitutions.  Here the  deposit-insurance  connection  is doubly  relevant.
First,  the existence of  deposit  insurance provides  incentives  to  S&L
managers  to  take  on  added risk.  Second, the  guaranty  insulates the
managers  from  the  unfortuante consequences  of  havi  ng  acqui  red  an
excessively risky asset  portfolio.  Insolvent instjtutions can  continue  to
bid for deposits  and  their  equjty shares  command  positive prices.  As  Kane
(1985)  asked:  trHow  long  could an underwater  MSB  [mutual  savings  bank]  or
S&L stay  open for  business jf  its  deposit  insurance were  rendered
i nope  rati ve?  I'
Second, concentration  on the expansion  of asset  powers  granted  by
the Garn-St  Germain  Depository  Institutions  Act of 1982  is beside  the p0int
for  the  si  ngl  e  most  affected  segment  of  the  S&L j  ndustry:  Texas
j  nstituti ons.  Texas  S&Ls  are i  n the vanguard  of the  i  ndustryr  s  probl  ems  '
Yet  Garn-St Germain  did  nothing  to  enhance  the  powers  of most  Texas
thrifts.  In fact.  the portion of Garn-St  Germain  dealing  with S&Ls' asset
powers was  model  led  after  the statute  that  had governed  state-chartered
S&Ls  sjnce  1974.  Indeed,  'investment powers of  these  state-chartered
institutions  still  exceeded  those  of  their  federal counterparts  after
passage  of Garn-St  Germain  (Brock  1983).13
As of the end  of 1986,  59 out of 281  Texas  S&Ls  (representing  20'7
percent  of  total  assets) had negative net worth, as measured  by regulatory14
accounting  princjpies (RAP). Another  54 S&Ls  (with 17.2 percent of  total
assets  had positive  net worth  but capital below  the 3 percent  *1ni*um.14
Regulatory  accounting  is extremely  liberal , of course,  and  includes  a  good
deal of fictitious  value  on the asset side.  This is  a lower-bound  estimate
of insolvency in  the  thrift  industry.  Moreover, conditjons  probably
deteriorated  significantly  in the first  quarter of 1987.15  Additionally,
as this  'i  s being  wrjtten,  the capital-insolvency  probiem  is  evolving  into
one  of possible  cash-flow  insolvency  at some  institutions.
If  not  expanded  asset powers,  then  what  explains  the timing and
magnitude  of the problems  experienced  by Texas  S&Ls? It  appears to  be  a
combination  of  three  factors: (1) the historical  evolution  of the thrift
industry; (2) the regulatory  climate; and  (3) the energy  crisis.
It  was  only in the post Garn-St  Germajn  era that  most  S&Ls were
able  to  diversify  away from  thejr  traditional  business of  issuing
fixed-rate mortgages  and  garnering  jnsured  deposits  to fund the  mortgages.
Though  the  nationrs  S&Ls gained  significant  n  ev./  asset  polrers  almost
overnight, they did not instantly acquire  the expertjse  or human  capital to
utjlize  the  powers.  In the short run, competence  of existing management
was  a constraint.  Indeed,  many  thrifts  moved  slowly to exploit  their  new
powers and, in retrospect, those  exhibiting caution  may  have  been  the best
manageo.
It  is unfortunately  true some that  instjtutjons  moved  alI  too
quickly  into the unfamiliar territory  of making  commercial  and  real-estate
loans.  This  was especial1y true  at  large  institutions  adopting the
strategy  of  rrgrowing  outrr  of  their  previous problem, which wasIf
characterized  by excessive  exposure  to  interest-rate risk.  This  part  of
the story is particularly  applicable  to Texas'  zombies. If  Garn-St  Germain
affected Texas  thrifts,  it  was  through  the enhancement  of  their 
'l 
iabiljty
powers (Brock  1983).  It  enabled  them  to fuel their  rapid growth  strategy
that has  culminated  jn the bust phase  of the current boom-bust  cycle.
The  new  managers  at Texas  thrifts  had  learned  a lesson: never  fill
up  an  jnvestment  portfol  io with fixed-rate mortgages. Unfortunately,  the
managers  learned  the wronq  lesson.  It  is not writing  fixed-rate  mortgages
that  constituted  S&Ls' former  problem. Rather,  the problem  consi  sted in
overconcentrati  ng  thejr  portfolios  in one  asset  category and  failing  to
malch assets  and  liability  matufities.  Instead  of using  the new  liability
powers  to build a diversified asset portfol  io,  the new  breed  of S&L  manager
went  headlong jnto  funding  real-estate development.  And  it  was  dubious
real-estate  development  at  that,  including,  perhaps,  questionable
t  ran  sact  i  ons.16
Adaptatjon to  change, be  it  envinonmental  or economic,  is an
evolutionary  process  (Nelson  and  Winter 1982).  Some  species  never 
'iearn 
to
adapt.  The  approximately  thirty  percent  of the S&L  industry that  is now  in
deep  water  appears  to fit  the description of an economic  dinosaur.  Having
lived  only  in an environment  of concentrated  asset portfolios,  it  knew  no
other.  Faced  with a  changed  envjronment, these  S&Ls gravitated  to  a
habitat  much ljke  the old one: an undiversified  asset  portfolio.  in the
process,  their portfoi  ios grew  rapidly and,  beginning in  1983,  negative
jnterest-rate  spreads had  been transformed 'into asset-quality probiems
(Barth, et al.  1985).16
Kane  (1987)  emphasizes  the regulatory  climate, especially the fact
that  the  FSLIC exerci  sed  too  much di  scretion in forbearing  on capital
standards. I  have  ljttle  to add  to  h'i  s  account.  Forbearance  not  only
sanctions  previous conduct but  jnvites  more of  the  same,  Deposit
'i  nsurance,  which  represents  an  implicit  federal  guaranty to  underwrjte
losses, funds  the continued  operation  of zombies. It  does  so, moreover,  at
the expense  of solvent  and  consenvatively managed  institutions,  who are
compelled to bid for  funds  in competitjon  with zombjes. The  latter  bid up
the cost of funds  in a never-ending  quest  to grow  out  of  ever-increasing
losses.
Fina11y, there  is the energy  crisis  about  which  so much  has  been
made, The  U.S. League  of  Savings Instjtutions  majntains that  external
economic  conditions,  not fraud or mismanagement,  are responsible  for most
S&L  problems. Certain'ly  there has  been  another  supply  shock  in energy and
one  would expect  that  this  would have affected  the  portion  of S&L
portfol  ios particularly  exposed  to this  sector.  And  the shock constjtutes
a possible  explanation  of why  the crisis  hit  Texas  instjtutions  earlier  and
with more  force.''  It  does  not explain, however, how the  portfolios  of
Texas  thrifts  (much  less  California  institutions)  came to  be  so
concentrated  in speculatjve real-estate  that  their  existence would be
threatened by  the shock. And,  more  to the point,  it  does  not explain how
zombie  institutions  continue  operating.  0nce  again, the  depo  s  i  t- i  n  surance
connecti  on provides  the answer,Publ  ic  Pol  icy:  Prospects and
fT
PitfaIls
The  financjal  services  industry has shown  a remarkable  capacity  to
circumvent regulatory  straightjackets.  Thjs  includes  innovating  new
products,  like money-market  funds; inventing  new  jnstitutional  forms,  like
the nonbank  bank;  and  finding ways  --  'inc'l  uding  lobbying  state legjslatures
to  break  down  geographical  barriers.  Restrjctions on banking  actjvity
remain  the last clear  obstacle  to  developing a  competjtive and  sound
banki  ng  system i  n  the  U.  S.  These  restni  cti ons  are I  i  kely to prove  l  ess
amenable  to cjrcumvention  (0'Driscoll  1987).
The  jntellectual  climate has  never  been  so favorable  to  arguments
both  for  deregul  ati  ng  deposi  tory  i  nsti  tuti ons  and  for  impl  ementi  ng
deposit-insurance refonm.  In  some  ways,  however, the  public  policy
environment  is  becomjng  less hospitable.  Instead  of further deregulating
depository  institutions,  Congress  tjghtened  loopholes.  Among other
actjons, it  closed  the nonbank-bank  loophole  without addressing  the reasons
why  thjs  institution  had  emerged  (England  1987).  The  Board of  Governors,
i  n  cooperati  on  wi  th  the  Eank of  Engl  and,  i  s  proposi  ng  a  system  of
risk-based  capital standards  that would  formal  ize categorical assessment  of
risk.  And Congress  appears  intent on privatizing the FSLIC's  deficit  by
requiring solvent  S&Ls  to bail out the insolvent ones.  h/hatever  the merjts
of  relying  on  the industry as much  as possible  in fashioning  a solution,
the deficit  as a whole  cannot  be orivatized.  The  income  and  assets  of  the
solvent  part  of  the  industry  are  insufficient  to  resolve  the zombie
problem. To insist  on a purely private soiution i s to  insure  that  there18
rii  I  I  continue to  be insufficient  resources  devoted  to the FSLIC. And  so
long as that is the case, the zombie  problem  will  be  \,rith  us.  And  if  the
zombies flourish,  they will  eventually suck  the life  from  the remainder  of
the industry (Kane  1987). 14e  need  to a fashion  a pubiic policy that allows
the  expeditious  ciosing of economical  ly  insolvent institutions  in order to
preserve  the sound  ones.  Then,  but only then, we  will  have a  safe  and
sound  fi nanci  al  svstem.19
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be  construed as  representing the  official  position of any  part of the
Federal  Reserve  system. The  paper  was  presented  at the 62nd  Annual  Western
Economic  Association  international Conference,  Vancouver,  8.C., July 1987.
I would  like  to acknowledge  the helpful comments  of  Edward  J.  Kane and
Robert  T. Clair.
1 *Schwartz  (1984,  pp.205,  209)  reassesses  her eanljer posjtjon.
t 'He  does  not  endorse the  present  regu'latory  system  in its  entirety;  he
specifical  ly questions  geographical  nestrictions imposed  by  the  I'lcFadden
Act and  the Douglas  Amendment  to the Bank  Holding  Company  Act.
2
"I  have  ient  credence to the argument  in my  own  work.  For example,  see
Garrison,  Short  and 0rDriscoll  (i987);  but  also  see  the  caveats in
0rDni  sco  l | (1987).
'I  have  included  traditional  brokerage  services  under  investment  banking,
E -White  (1986,  p. 39) says  thar rhe
opposi  ti on from  the  banks,  the
Department  and  the  White  House."
opposi  ti on from  each  group.
ocited in tdhite  (1983,  p. 197).
'Cjted in White  (1983,  p. 197); emphasis  added.
"I  discuss  these  complementarit'ies  in the next section.
-See  OrDriscoll (1985,  p.  5)  for  a  conventional chronjcle  of  deposit
deregulatjon.  Merris  and Wood  (1985,  p.  69)  question the accounr,
pointing out  that  recent  financial  innovations I'almost entirely
represent returns to practices that were  well-established  by the 1920s  or
the resumption  of trends that  were  underway in  that  decade but  were 'i  nterrupted  by the Great  Depression  and  lrlorld  liar II."  The  decade  of the
1920s  was  one  of price stabil  ity  not jnflation  and,  obviously,  djffered
radically  in its  availabie technology. The  story of financial innovation
in the last quarter century  does  need  to be reexamined.
1n '"In  the 1970s,  First  Pennsylvania  Corp.  required  FDIC assj  stance because
of  losses  experienced  on its  bond  portfolio.  First  Pennsy  bet the bank
on declining interest rates but nates  rose.  The  story  is  unusual, but
purchasing bonds is,  once  again, an example  of approved,  old fashioned
banki  ng acti  vi  ty.
1932  draft  of  the Act "met with  strong
Federal  Reserve Board,  the  Treasury
He  does  not ampljfy on the grounds  of?0
1lone  obvious  caveat  is  relevant.  A  depository  institutjon  may become
ni  skier  by concentnatjng  jts  portfol'io.  In other words,  the institution
may  adopt a "shoot the moonrr  strategy.  VJhen  permitted to  branch  freely,
however, commercial  banks do  not  appean  to  find thi s an attractive
strategy.  (For evidence  on  this  point  with  respect  lo  agricultural
lending,  see  Smith  [1987].  )  A segment  of the savings  and 
'loan 
industry
does  appear  to have  adopted  the strategy.  But see  the text,  below,  for a
dj  scussi  on  of  probl  ems in the thri ft  i  ndustry.  In any  case, observi  ng
that a bank  may  not use  its  freedom  to diversify does  not  constitute  a
reason  to deny  them  the ability  to do so.
12...  .  .
slnt!e (1986) considers a  number  of  other factors, including  alleged
by securities affil iates of commercial  banks.
rJIn mid-1983,  231  of the 284  Texas  S&Ls  were  state  chartered and  these





14Bert  Ely suppl  ied both the data and  the calculations.
assessment  reflects the losses  that accrued  jn the first  quarter of
Losses,  of course,  erode  capitai.
16Th. 
"ole 
of alleged fraud and  abuse  in current S&L  problems  is  receiving
increased attention.  See.  for  instance. "Extensive  Misconduct  Seen  ir
Ca1if. S&1s,"  Washinqton  Posl, June  13, 1987;  and  "FBI  Bolsters  Effort
Against Fraud  in-TExl!-Eai-ks,  '' ," Wall Street Journal, June  18, 1987.
'11
''Whatever the  plausibi  l  ity  of the Leaguers  position on problems  at Texas
thrifts,  it  is  incomprehensib'le  as  an  explanatjon of  probiems  at
California  S&Ls.  The California  economy,  the envy  of the rest of the
nation, is booming  and  has  been  throughout  the recovery.21
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